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New Hampshire Got it Right:                                   
Statutes, Case Law and Related Issues Involving Post-
Secondary Education Payments and Divorced Parents 
RYAN C. LEONARD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Divorced parents in New Hampshire can rest a little easier these days.  
While there are a myriad of economic reasons why a divorce can become 
contentious, financing a child’s college education can no longer be in-
cluded among those reasons.  In January 2004, in a rather bold and uncon-
ventional move, the New Hampshire legislature overruled years of legal 
precedent and enacted a new statutory amendment that should alleviate 
some of the financial pressures divorced parents inevitably face.  The 
amendment, RSA § 458:17(XI-a), is a victory for divorcees across the state 
because it prohibits superior court judges from issuing orders forcing di-
vorced parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses.1   
The best interest of the child rule is consistently invoked by American 
courts when dealing with children in custody disputes because courts have 
an overriding interest in protecting a child’s welfare.2  Generally, this rule 
is applied with the best of intentions.  However, the best interest of the 
child rule should never be considered when dealing with post-secondary 
education payments.  By ordering divorced parents to support their adult 
children, courts across the country continue to violate the constitutional 
rights of those parents.  Treating similarly situated people the same should 
be the goal of our legal system.  Ordering divorced adults to pay or con-
tribute to their child’s college expenses, when no such order can be made 
of married adults, does not accomplish this goal.  As a result of these un-
just orders, the equal protection rights of divorced parents are consistently 
violated throughout this country.  The New Hampshire legislature recog-
nized the inequality of these judicial orders and recently amended the law.3  
  
 *  J.D., 2005, Franklin Piece Law Center, Concord, N.H.; B.S., 2001, The College of New Jersey, 
Ewing, N.J.  I am currently employed at Geoff Gray, LLC in Salem, NH.  I would like to thank the 
members of the Pierce Law Review, particularly Douglas Edmunds, Paul Homer and Alison Bethel, for 
their constructive criticism and helpful feedback. 
 1. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17 (XI-a) (2004). 
 2. E.g. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 465 A.2d 888, 892 (N.H. 1983) (an example of a New Hampshire case 
that used the best interest of the child standard in a custody dispute). 
 3. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17 (XI-a). 
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Now is the time for all other states that do not have similar laws currently 
in place to follow suit. 
Over the last fifty years, divorce has become commonplace in Ameri-
can society with divorces doubling over that time, from 2.3 divorces per 
1,000 people in 1955, to 4.6 divorces per 1,000 people in 2001.4  Divorce 
rates now are around fifty percent nationwide.5  As a result, stigmas once 
associated with divorce have all but disappeared.  However, one stigma 
still remains in some states: requiring divorced parents to pay for college 
education expenses of their children.6   
By ordering married couples to pay for their child’s college education, 
states would be viewed as interfering with the sanctity of marriage.  As a 
result, states do not impose limits on parents’ decision-making as it relates 
to a child’s upbringing.  Therefore, every intact family is free to decide 
whether a child will go to college, where the child will go, how payments 
will be made, and who will contribute to the expenses.  Even with the col-
lege tuition burden falling by about one-third since 1998, the decision 
about how to pay for college should be resolved by the child’s parents, 
whether married or divorced, at the time a child is eligible to go to college 
since higher education expenses take a large portion out of most families’ 
income.7  Judges should not be able to order a parent who is, and always 
will be, unwilling to pay for college expenses to make payments solely 
because he or she is no longer married.  Parents should be free to provide 
for current and future college expenses to the best of their ability at the 
time a child reaches the appropriate age; they should never be required to 
do so.   
This article will use the recent New Hampshire amendment, prohibit-
ing judges from ordering parents to pay for college expenses, as a back-
drop for advocating that all states pass similar statutes.  Part II of this arti-
cle begins with a discussion of the state of the law in New Hampshire be-
fore the statute was amended in 2004.  Next, the article discusses the rele-
vant portions of the recent New Hampshire amendment.  The article next 
outlines laws from various states in order to compare and contrast views 
from the rest of the country.  In Part III, the focus shifts to the equal protec-
tion arguments both for and against divorced parents in relation to manda-
  
 4. Americans for Divorce Reform, Divorce Rates, http://www.divorcereform.org/03statab.html 
(accessed May 22, 2006). 
 5. Id. at http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (accessed May 22, 2006) (the fifty percent rate is 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s estimate for 2002). 
 6. See e.g. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 513(a)(2) (2005); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240 (1-b)(c)(7) (McKin-
ney 2003); Hale v. Hale, 132 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1942) (examples of states that require 
parents to pay for their child’s college education). 
 7. Dennis Cauchon, Tuition Burden Falls by a Third (June 28, 2004) (available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-06-28-tuition-burden-cover-usat_x.htm.  
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tory post-secondary education orders.  Part IV of this article will analyze 
the laws from various states and address problems courts have either failed 
to address or have inadequately addressed.  Finally, this article concludes 
by advocating in favor of the New Hampshire amendment and arguing that 
other states should follow New Hampshire’s lead and adopt similar ver-
sions of RSA § 458:17(XI-a). 
II. COMPARISON OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION LAWS 
A. Pre-Amendment New Hampshire Law  
Prior to January 2004, the New Hampshire legislature gave state supe-
rior court judges broad discretionary powers in relation to the support, 
maintenance, and custody of children of divorce.8  The law, in relevant 
part, stated, “[i]n all cases where there shall be a decree of divorce . . . the 
court shall make such further decree in relation to the support, education, 
and custody of the children . . . and may order a reasonable provision for 
their support and education.”9  “This provision had been part of New 
Hampshire law for well over a century.”10   
LeClair v. LeClair11 is the seminal New Hampshire case regarding 
post-secondary education support.12  The parties in LeClair got divorced 
when their son Jeremy was five years old.13  Subsequently, Jeremy lived 
with his father until the age of sixteen when he moved in with his mother.14  
However, communication between Jeremy’s parents after the divorce was 
so poor that they did not discuss his college choice with each other.15  Once 
Jeremy decided to attend college, his mother filed a petition with the supe-
rior court requesting that her ex-husband be ordered to make a reasonable 
contribution toward their son’s college expenses.16  Jeremy’s father fought 
the petition, alleging that he did not have sufficient assets to make a sub-
stantial contribution to any expenses.17  
The superior court disagreed with Mr. LeClair’s arguments and, after 
reviewing both parties’ financial situations, ordered him to contribute more 
  
 8. In re Breault, 821 A.2d 1118, 1121 (N.H. 2003). 
 9. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I) (1992, amended 1993, repealed 2004). 
 10. LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1353 (N.H. 1993). 
 11. 624 A.2d 1350. 
 12. Id. at 1353. 
 13. Id. at 1352. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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than eight thousand dollars to Jeremy’s education.  In determining each 
party’s share of the tuition costs, the superior court took the total tuition 
cost per year, $22,900.00 at the time LeClair was decided, and subtracted 
the sum of: Jeremy’s qualification for student loans, grants, and work 
study; Jeremy’s expected financial contribution, including his savings, as 
determined by the college’s financial aid office; and any contributions 
from Jeremy’s grandparents.  The end result amounted to Mr. LeClair hav-
ing to pay $8,056.00.18 
Prior to 1987, RSA § 458:17 also authorized courts to order divorced 
parents to place money in a trust for the maintenance and education of a 
minor child.19  In 1987, however, the New Hampshire legislature repealed 
and then reenacted the trust fund statute, which allowed courts to establish 
trusts for the education of a child who is eighteen years of age or older if 
the child is in college.20  Relying on this legislative action, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court ruled that RSA § 458:20 specifically granted superior 
courts the authority to order a parent to contribute toward an adult child’s 
educational expenses.21  In making this ruling, the Court found a clear in-
tent by the legislature to recognize a superior court judge’s authority to 
order parents, consistent with their means, to pay their child’s secondary 
education expenses.22  When making this type of order, however, the supe-
rior court can only order a divorced parent to pay a reasonable portion of 
the educational expenses.23 
Three recent cases have clarified the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s 
holding in LeClair.24  In In re Gilmore,25 the Court stated that a parent’s 
obligation to pay child support ceases when the child turns eighteen or 
graduates from high school, whichever is later.26  However, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court took the opportunity to reaffirm the Court’s 
decision in LeClair by saying that RSA § 458:35-c does not place a time 
limit on a parent’s obligation to pay for reasonable college expenses.27  The 
Court found that the purpose of RSA § 458:35-c was to ensure that both 
parents share responsibility for supporting their children according to the 
relative percentage of each parent’s income.28   
  
 18. Id. (affirming the judgment of the superior court). 
 19. Id. at 1353. 
 20. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:20 (1992).   
 21. LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1353. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Azzi v. Azzi, 392 A.2d 148, 151 (N.H. 1978). 
 24. See generally In re Barrett, 841 A.2d 74 (N.H. 2004); In re Breault, 821 A.2d at 1118; In re 
Gilmore, 803 A.2d 601 (N.H. 2002) (cases decided after LeClair that further clarify the Court’s ruling). 
 25. 803 A.2d 601. 
 26. Id. at 601, 603 (citing N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:35-c (1992)). 
 27. In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 603. 
 28. In re Barrett, 841 A.2d at 77. 
File: Leonard - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 507 Created on: 6/7/2006 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:31:00 PM 
2006 POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION PAYMENTS AND DIVORCE 509 
While there was no dispute over the superior court’s authority to order 
the father to contribute to his daughter’s education in In re Gilmore, there 
was an objection to paying what was considered incidental costs.29  This 
argument allowed the Supreme Court to identify, for the first time in New 
Hampshire, what the Court considered “educational expenses.”30  The 
Court defined educational expenses as those that are directly related to a 
child’s college education.31  These expenses include “tuition, books, room, 
board, and other directly related fees.”32  Educational expenses do not in-
clude transportation costs, medical expenses, or clothing, which Mr. Gil-
more was originally required to pay.33  The Gilmore Court stated that de-
fining educational expenses more broadly would essentially require a par-
ent to pay additional child support, which would conflict with RSA § 
458:35-c.34   
In In re Breault,35 the Court held that, pursuant to RSA § 458:35-c, a 
trial court has the authority to issue an original or modified child support 
order that terminates when the child graduates from college.36  The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court again reaffirmed LeClair by stating that a supe-
rior court has the discretion, in both original and modified orders, to re-
quire divorced parents to contribute to their children’s college education.37  
However, the Breault Court held that any order requiring divorced parents 
to contribute to their child’s post-secondary education must be “equitable 
in the light of the circumstances of all of the parties.”38 
By the end of 2002, it was well established in New Hampshire that a 
superior court judge could require divorced parents to pay for their child’s 
educational expenses as long as the order followed the requirements set 
forth in LeClair, In re Breault, and In re Gilmore.39  However, imminent 
legislative change would soon alter the State’s child support law and effec-
tively remove some judicial discretion from the superior courts. 
  
 29. 803 A.2d at 603. 
 30. Id. at 604. 
 31. Id.   
 32. Id.   
 33. Id. at 603. 
 34. Id. at 604. 
 35. 821 A.2d 1118. 
 36. Id. at 1121. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See generally In re Breault, 821 A.2d at 1121; In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 603; LeClair, 624 
A.2d at 1353 (cases outlining the requirements imposed on divorced parents relating to payment of a 
child’s college expenses). 
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B. 2004 New Hampshire Amendment  
In January of 2003, the New Hampshire legislature introduced a bill 
proposing to change the existing law regarding post-secondary education 
orders.40  The previous statute, which applied before the amendment was 
introduced, granted superior courts the authority to order divorced parents 
to contribute to their child’s post-secondary educational expenses.41  This 
new bill was drafted to amend RSA § 458:17 by inserting the following 
provision: “No child support order shall require a parent to contribute to an 
adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the 
completion of high school.”42  The purpose of this provision, according to 
the bill’s sponsor, was to remove a trial judge’s discretion when ordering 
divorced parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses.43  
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted in favor of the bill, 
and on January 1, 2004, the new child support provision took effect.44  The 
new law is codified as RSA § 458:17(XI-a).45  As a result of this new statu-
tory amendment, LeClair and its progeny were overruled. 
C. State Laws Comparable to the Recent New Hampshire Amendment 
While the New Hampshire legislature recently overturned existing case 
law regarding post-secondary education support, many other states have 
laws similar to RSA § 458:17(XI-a).  For instance, in Florida, the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal ruled in Klein v. Klein46 that a parent is not re-
sponsible for support after a child reaches his or her eighteenth birthday.47  
In Klein, the parties were married for sixteen years and had two children.48  
At all times during the marriage, the mother was totally dependent on the 
father for support.49  As a result, the court awarded the wife a “lump sum 
alimony” payment as well as monthly alimony payments in order to main-
tain her accustomed living arrangements.50  However, the court refused to 
extend the father’s payouts to include support payments for his daughter’s 
college expenses.51  The court reasoned that since college attendance does 
  
 40. N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year (2003). 
 41. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I) (1992); LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1353. 
 42. N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.   
 45. Id. 
 46. 413 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1982). 
 47. Id. at 1300. 
 48. Id. at 1298. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1299. 
 51. Id. at 1300. 
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not render a child a legal dependant, courts do not have the authority to 
require parents to furnish their offspring with such an advanced educa-
tion.52 
In Ohio, the law regarding payment of post-secondary education ex-
penses is well settled and set forth in Bardes v. Todd.53  In Bardes, the 
court restated the rule regarding payment of post-secondary educational 
expenses as follows: without a specific agreement of the parties and the 
subsequent adoption of the agreement by a trial court, a judge generally 
has no authority to issue orders setting aside money for future college ex-
penses of a minor child.54  However, this rule only applies if the money 
would be used after the child reaches the age of majority.55  In addition, the 
Bardes court stated that no case law supported a holding that attending a 
college of one’s choice is a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution, even for the most gifted of children.56 
A similar bright-line rule applies to forced post-secondary education 
payments in Texas.  In the case of Woodruff v. Woodruff,57 the father of a 
minor son attending college petitioned the court to reduce his child support 
payments due to a “changed condition.”58  The father argued that since the 
son was in college, and college was not a “necessity of life,” the son’s 
changed condition warranted a reduction in child support.59  Under Texas 
law, each parent has a duty to support his or her minor children and pro-
vide them with necessities of life.60  Necessities of life include food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and medical attention.61   
The Woodruff court held that a college education does not fit under the 
statutory definition of necessity of life but is instead a “special advan-
tage.”62  The Texas court conceded that the court could not order a di-
vorced parent to pay for post-secondary education costs of their children 
under state law.63  However, the court stated that if the parties voluntarily 
agreed to pay educational expenses, the agreement would preclude a reduc-
tion in child support.64  Because of the agreement in this case, Mr. Wood-
  
 52. Id. 
 53. 746 N.E.2d 229, 235 (Ohio App. 1st Dist. 2000). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 234. 
 57. 487 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
 58. Id. at 793. 
 59. Id. at 792-93. 
 60. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 4.02 (1972).  
 61. Id. 
 62. 487 S.W.2d at 793. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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ruff was not able to take advantage of Texas’ pro-divorcee rule, and his 
child support payments were not reduced.65 
Payment toward post-secondary education in Massachusetts, while dif-
fering from the rules in Florida, Ohio, and Texas, still favors divorced par-
ents by placing a burden on the children to meet the strict statutory re-
quirements.66  An illustration of this strict requirement occurred in L.W.K. 
v. E.R.C.,67 where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court answered the 
question of whether a judge may posthumously set aside a lump sum pay-
ment in trust as security for future educational support of a child.68  The 
Court found that the Massachusetts legislature explicitly provided that in 
some circumstances, parents have an obligation to provide educational 
support for their children who have attained the age of eighteen.69  Similar 
to the previous version of RSA § 458:17(I), in Massachusetts, a judge may 
make appropriate orders of maintenance, support, and education for any 
child who has reached the age of eighteen.70  However, the Massachusetts 
legislature restricts application of this statute to individuals who have not 
attained the age of twenty-one, who are domiciled in the home of a parent, 
and who are principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.71  
Although this statute places a significant burden upon parents to support 
their children, unlike the laws in effect in New Hampshire and Florida, the 
Massachusetts statute places limitations on educational support awards if 
the terms of the statute are not strictly complied with.72  This difference is 
shown in L.W.K. where the Court overturned the educational trust because 
there was no showing that the beneficiary, a ten-year-old boy, would meet 
the statutory requirements set forth in the Massachusetts statute.73 
Four years after L.W.K. was decided, the Appeals Court of Massachu-
setts revisited the issue of assigning post-secondary education payments to 
divorced parents in Ketterle v. Ketterle.74  In Ketterle, the father of three 
children objected to being assigned the responsibility of paying for the 
educational expenses of his three children.75  The court, relying on prece-
dent, stated, “[a]s a general rule, support orders regarding the future pay-
  
 65. Id. 
 66. See generally L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 735 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2000); Ketterle v. Ketterle, 814 N.E.2d 
385 (Mass. App. 2004) (examples of Massachusetts cases where children must meet strict statutory 
requirements in order for their divorced parents to be ordered to pay for their college education). 
 67. 735 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2000). 
 68. Id. at 370. 
 69. Id.   
 70. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209C § 9 (2004). 
 71. Id.   
 72. L.W.K., 735 N.E.2d at 371. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 814 N.E.2d at 387. 
 75. Id. at 391. 
File: Leonard - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 507 Created on: 6/7/2006 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:31:00 PM 
2006 POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION PAYMENTS AND DIVORCE 513 
ment of post-high school educational costs are premature and should not be 
made.”76  The reason for this rule, according to the court, is that “[s]upport 
orders are meant to address the current and not the future needs of chil-
dren.”77  As a result, the court overturned the father’s support obligations 
for his younger children, then aged thirteen and ten.78  However, because 
college was imminent for the oldest child, the court upheld the trial court 
ruling ordering Mr. Ketterle to pay for that child’s educational expenses.79 
In Pennsylvania, similar to the situation in New Hampshire, the law 
requiring divorced parents to pay for post-secondary education was in a 
state of flux in the mid-1990’s.80  Prior to 1995, the rule, as set forth by 
statute, stated that a court may order either or both parents who are di-
vorced to provide equitably for educational costs of their child.81  This rule 
applied whenever a parent sought a support order – regardless of whether 
the child had reached the age of eighteen.82  Additionally, educational ex-
pense orders are only issued after a child makes a reasonable effort to ap-
ply for scholarships, grants and work-study assistance.83  The Pennsylvania 
legislature, in making these provisions, stated that each parent shared the 
responsibility of providing post-secondary education support.84   
Brown v. Brown,85 however, limited the scope of this statute slightly.86  
In Brown, Robert, a law student, requested that his father continue to pro-
vide medical insurance for him while he was in school.87  In addition, 
Robert requested that he be given a monthly allowance of $150.00.88  The 
court ruled against Robert because the court found that the legislature in-
tended the Pennsylvania child support laws to limit post-secondary educa-
tion to the pursuit of an undergraduate education leading to a bachelor’s 
degree.89  Therefore, the term “college” in Pennsylvania does not include 
within its ambit post-graduate degrees or professional-level training.90 
In 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Cur-
tis v. Kline,91 abolished the framework established under the Pennsylvania 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 4327(a) (1994). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id. 
 85. 474 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. 1984). 
 86. Id. at 1169. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 1170. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995). 
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statute and Brown v. Brown.92  In Curtis, the Court held that requiring par-
ents to pay for post-secondary education was a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.93  In overruling established statutory law, the Court held that there 
was no rational basis for a state government to require only certain adult 
citizens to pay for post-secondary education expenses.94  In so holding, the 
Court effectively voiced displeasure for the statute, which required only 
non-intact families to provide such expenses for their children.95  
D. State Laws Differing from the Recent New Hampshire Amendment 
Not every state shares New Hampshire’s view that divorced parents 
should not be required to pay for a child’s post-secondary education.96  An 
example contrary to New Hampshire’s view is evident in the California 
case Hale v. Hale.97  In Hale, the parties divorced when their son was four 
years old, and the court entered a child support order in favor of the mother 
who received custody of the boy.98  When the boy turned eighteen and was 
admitted to Princeton University, the mother petitioned the court for an 
increase in support to cover additional expenses that attending college 
would bring upon the family.99   
The question the court answered in Hale was whether a trial court had 
the authority to make an order to cover the necessary expenses of higher 
education.100  The court ruled that California law gave courts, rather than 
parents, the right to make ultimate decisions regarding the welfare of chil-
dren when divorce proceedings have been initiated.101  The court’s ruling 
was based on the idea that when domestic relations are strained, trial 
courts, based on all the facts and circumstances, should determine the 
proper amount of support each child is entitled to receive.102  If attending 
college is in the best interest of the child, then a trial court’s support order 
can include the requirement that a parent pay for their child’s secondary 
education as long as the court thinks the parent is financially secure.103   
  
 92. Id. at 270. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 269-70. 
 95. Id. at 269. 
 96. Hale, 132 P.2d at 68. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 68-69. 
 102. Id. at 69. 
 103. Id. 
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The Hale court determined that there was an overriding public policy 
in California for all citizens to receive a college education.104  According to 
the court, this policy was supported by the fact that many of the State’s 
higher learning institutions were maintained at the public’s expense.105  
This policy was affirmed seven years later in Rawley v. Rawley,106 when 
the court again addressed the issue of whether a parent can be compelled to 
pay for their child’s college education.107  While the father in Rawley con-
ceded that he was required to pay for maintenance and support of his child, 
he argued that he was under no legal duty to pay for college expenses.108  
In affirming Hale, the Rawley court said that as long as trial courts do not 
abuse their discretion, they will continue to have the ability to order a par-
ent to pay for their child’s higher education.109  However, the Rawley court 
did acknowledge the California trial court’s authority to modify any sup-
port order should the circumstances of either party change. 110 
Another state that allows courts to issue support orders requiring di-
vorced parents to pay for post-secondary education expenses is Illinois.111  
In Illinois, courts are governed by the Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act (“the Act”), which states that “[a] court may . . . make [a] provi-
sion for the educational expenses of the child or children of the parties, 
whether of minor or majority age.”112  According to the Act, educational 
expenses include, among other things, room, board, dues, tuition, transpor-
tation, books, fees, registration and application costs, medical expenses, 
and living expenses during the school year and recess.113   
The Act was relied upon in In re Marriage of Sreenan,114 where a fa-
ther appealed the trial court’s ruling ordering him to pay the college educa-
tion expenses of two of his children.115  The father argued that because the 
relationship between himself and his children had deteriorated, he should 
not have to make any post-secondary education support payments.116  The 
court rejected the father’s argument and upheld the order requiring him to 
contribute to his children’s educational expenses because the Act’s support 
  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 210 P.2d 891 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1949). 
 107. Id. at 892. 
 108. Id. at 893. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 513(a)(2). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. 402 N.E.2d 348 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1980). 
 115. Id. at 349. 
 116. Id. at 350. 
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obligation was not conditioned on whether a parent had a good, on-going 
relationship with their child.117 
The “educational expenses” clause of the Act was challenged six years 
later in In re Pearson,118 when a divorced father challenged the trial court’s 
support order that included a provision providing for the college education 
of his youngest child.119  The father argued that the trial court erred by im-
posing upon him a support order that prevented him from paying his 
monthly expenses.120  In deciding this matter, the Court looked to the Act, 
which outlined the relevant factors a court should consider before making 
an award determination.121   
The guidelines set forth in the Act include: the financial resources of 
both parents; the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the 
parties remained married; the financial resources of the child; and the 
child’s academic performance.122  After considering all of the listed factors, 
the Pearson Court ruled that the Act’s “educational expense” clause does 
not mandate that divorced parents must pay for a child’s post-secondary 
education in all cases; the clause just exists so that courts may order a party 
to make education-related support payments.123  The Court held that the 
legislature, in passing the Act, intended for the trial court to have broad 
discretion when ordering a parent to contribute to their child’s college edu-
cation.124 
A recent Illinois case outlined exactly how much discretion a trial 
court is afforded in ordering divorced parents to pay for educational ex-
penses.  In In re Cianchetti,125 the court ordered the father to pay half of 
the total cost of college expenses for each of his two daughters.126  The 
father, in challenging the trial court’s order, argued that he was not in a 
financial position to pay the ordered college costs, and, in addition, that a 
person should not be required to pay for educational expenses that he or 
she cannot afford.127   
In ruling on the father’s arguments, the court reiterated the Illinois rule 
that trial court decisions to award educational expenses can only be over-
turned if the decisions are against the “manifest weight of the evidence.”128  
  
 117. Id. at 352. 
 118. 490 N.E.2d 1274 (Ill. 1986). 
 119. Id. at 1275. 
 120. Id. at 1277. 
 121. Id. at 1275. 
 122. 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/513(b) (2005); In re Pearson, 490 N.E.2d at 1275. 
 123. 490 N.E.2d at 1277. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 815 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 2004). 
 126. Id. at 18. 
 127. Id. at 19. 
 128. Id. 
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According to the court, a ruling against the manifest weight of the evidence 
occurs when the opposite conclusion was clearly evident, or when a ruling 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.129  Adhering to 
the broad discretion given to the trial court, the Cianchetti court upheld the 
support order and found no abuse of discretion existed because, despite the 
added expense to the father’s budget, the court found he was able to make 
similar payments in the past for high school expenses and child support.130  
Similar to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, New 
York has codified a rule outlining payment of educational expenses by a 
divorced parent.131  In New York, a trial court, taking into account all of 
the facts and circumstances of the parties as well as the best interests of the 
child, may include educational expenses for post-secondary education in a 
basic child support order between divorced parents.132  The statute also 
allows trial courts to determine the manner in which the non-custodial par-
ent pays the required educational expenses, including direct payment to the 
educational provider.133   
Prior to the enactment of this statutory provision, New York trial 
courts could only order a divorced parent to pay educational expenses if 
“special circumstances” existed.134  In Kaplan v. Wallshein,135 the court 
ruled that absent special circumstances or a voluntary agreement, a court 
could not order divorced parents to pay for college education expenses of 
their children.136  In determining whether special circumstances existed, the 
court looked to three factors: the educational background of the parent; the 
child’s academic ability; and the parent’s financial ability to provide for 
the educational expenses.137  Only when all of these factors are met, a trial 
court can require a divorced parent to provide the necessary expenses.138 
However, once the New York legislature passed the educational ex-
penses provision, the special circumstances requirement New York courts 
had previously relied upon no longer applied to divorced parents.139  In 
Manno v. Manno,140 the court affirmed the new statutory provision, hold-
ing that a court may properly direct a parent to contribute to a child’s col-
  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 21-22. 
 131. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1-b)(c)(7). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Kaplan v. Wallshein, 57 A.D.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1977). 
 135. 57 A.D.2d 828. 
 136. See id. at 829. 
 137. See id.  
 138. See id.  
 139. Manno v. Manno, 196 A.D.2d 488, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 1993). 
 140. 196 A.D.2d 488. 
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lege education, even in the absence of special circumstances.141  The 
Manno court narrowed the scope of the new law by warning trial courts not 
to “improvidently exercise” their discretion in ordering college education 
payments.142   
The Manno court also set forth factors that a trial court must consider 
before ordering educational expenses.143  These factors include: the cir-
cumstances of the case; the circumstances of the respective parties; the best 
interests of the children; and the requirements of justice.144  The court re-
solved Manno by holding that the father should not have been ordered to 
pay for his child’s college education expenses because the support order 
was too burdensome since half of the man’s take-home pay was de-
ducted.145  In reaching this conclusion, the Manno court followed the 
newly enacted statute as well as the court-imposed educational expense 
factors.146 
The law in New Jersey regarding child support and educational ex-
penses differs from those in Illinois and New York because New Jersey 
does not have a codified rule permitting trial courts to include such ex-
penses in support orders.  As a result, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
given trial courts the discretion to include post-secondary education ex-
penses when issuing support orders to divorcees.147  For example, in Kha-
laf v. Khalaf,148 the Court, deciding the proper support that the father 
should pay to his ex-wife and son, determined that college expenses can be 
included as part of a child support order.149  Khalaf presented the unique 
situation of parents who separated while paying for their son’s college 
education.150  After the parties separated, the father refused to continue 
paying his son’s college expenses.151   
In deciding Khalaf, the Court assumed that had it not been for the 
separation, the son’s tuition and expenses would have continued to been 
provided by his parents.152  While recognizing a trend towards higher edu-
cation, the Court authorized mandatory education provisions in future child 
  
 141. Id. at 491. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 492. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Khalaf v. Khalaf, 275 A.2d 132 (N.J. 1971). 
 148. Id.. 
 149. Id. at 136-37. 
 150. Id. at 136. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
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support orders as long as the child showed a scholastic aptitude and the 
parents were able to afford the added expense.153 
Five years after Khalaf was decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in 
Newburgh v. Arrigo,154 expanded the scope of parental responsibility by 
including the duty to pay for a child’s college and post-graduate educa-
tions.155  The Newburgh Court viewed education as a flexible concept that 
varies depending on the circumstances.156  Consequently, the Court stated 
that the influx of a wide variety of educational institutions meant that post-
secondary education was available to anyone who wished to attend.157  As 
a result of this changing atmosphere, the Court came to the conclusion that 
financially capable parents should be required to contribute to their chil-
dren’s higher education.158   
In establishing this new requirement, the Court listed twelve relevant 
factors that should be considered when making an education expense order 
including: whether the parent would have contributed towards the cost of 
the education; the amount of contribution sought by the child; the ability of 
the parent to pay the requested cost; the financial resources of the child; 
and the child’s relationship to the paying parent.159  The Newburgh deci-
sion provides the most comprehensive set of factors a court should con-
sider when deciding whether to order parents to pay child support in the 
form of post-secondary education expenses. 
Maryland is another state that allows spousal support orders to include 
college educations for couples’ marital children.160  In Wooddy v. 
  
 153. Id. at 137.   
 154. 443 A.2d 1031 (N.J. 1982). 
 155. Id. at 1038. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1038-39.  The twelve factors mentioned by the court include:  
 
(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the costs 
of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background, values and goals of the 
parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education; (3) the 
amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the abil-
ity of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the 
kind of school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of both par-
ents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (8) the fi-
nancial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodianship 
or trust; (9) the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation; 
(10) the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child’s 
relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as well as re-
sponsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship of the education re-
quested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child. 
 
Id. 
 160. 265 A.2d 467 (Md. 1970). 
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Wooddy,161 the Court stated that a college degree is a necessity if the 
child’s station in life justifies a higher education.162  As a result, the Court 
held that as long as a parent is financially able to provide support for a 
post-secondary education, fighting this responsibility is no longer an option 
for a parent in Maryland.163  
Similarly, in Oregon, trial courts are permitted to “set aside, alter or 
modify . . . [a divorce] decree as may provide for . . . the nurture and/or 
education [of the parties’ children].”164  In upholding the law, the Court 
ignored the argument that a child who reaches the age of majority is not 
eligible to receive the benefits of post-secondary education expenses.165  
To support the Court’s decision, the Court, quoting Blackstone’s Commen-
taries, eloquently stated that “[t]he last duty of parents to their children is 
that of giving them an education suitable to their station in life; a duty 
pointed out by reason and by far the greatest importance of any.”166   
In coming out in favor of ordering financial support for higher educa-
tion, the Court in Jackman v. Short167 took the now antiquated view that a 
child of divorced parents is in greater need of the help that a college educa-
tion can provide than a child living in a home with marital harmony.168  To 
the Court’s credit though, the Oregon Supreme Court foreshadowed future 
state court rulings when the Court looked at a parent’s financial ability to 
pay the requested education expenses before issuing a support order to that 
effect.169 
As the previous parts of this article have illustrated, there is a major 
divide among state courts and legislatures on the issue of ordering divorced 
parents to contribute to their child’s post-secondary education.  While 
many states have drafted statutes or developed their own set of factors or 
circumstances trial courts must look to before ordering parents to pay for 
their child’s higher education costs, only two states, New Hampshire and 
Pennsylvania, have addressed whether ordering divorced parents to make 
“educational expense” payments violates that parent’s equal protection 
rights.170 
  
 161. Id. at 467. 
 162. Id. at 472. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Jackman v. Short, 109 P.2d 860, 865 (Or. 1941). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 866 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, 424). 
 167. 109 P.2d 860. 
 168. Id. at 872. 
 169. Id. at 872-73. 
 170. LeClair, 624 A.2d at 1355-57; Curtis, 666 A.2d at 268-70. 
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III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT 
Equal protection analysis requires courts to review the right in question 
utilizing one of three tests set forth by the United States Supreme Court: 
(1) strict scrutiny;171 (2) intermediate scrutiny;172 or (3) rational basis re-
view.173  The standard applied to the right in question determines which 
party has the burden of proof in the case.174  For example, if a law that dis-
criminates based on race is challenged, the strict scrutiny standard requires 
the government to prove the law serves a compelling government interest, 
and to show that the law is narrowly tailored to fit the compelling inter-
est.175  The next level of equal protection analysis, intermediate scrutiny, 
requires the government to prove that the challenged law serves an impor-
tant government interest that the law is substantially related to achieving 
those interests.176  Under rational basis review, however, the lowest level of 
scrutiny under equal protection challenges, the challenged law merely 
needs to serve a legitimate government purpose in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.177  Rational basis review is the easiest equal protection stan-
dard for a law to survive because as long as there is some legitimate gov-
ernment purpose, the law can be over-inclusive or under-inclusive and still 
be rationally related to the stated government interest.178 
A. Equal Protection Arguments Supporting the New Hampshire Amend-
ment  
When the New Hampshire legislature passed RSA § 458:17(XI-a) in 
January 2004, one of the law’s stated purposes was to remove the discre-
tion of superior court judges to order parents to pay for a child’s post-
secondary education.179  However, the recent New Hampshire law does not 
mention the fact that mandatory post-secondary education payments vio-
  
 171. E.g. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding race, as a suspect classification, warrants 
the most rigid scrutiny). 
 172. E.g. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (holding that gender differences, while not as 
suspect as race, deserve a heightened level of scrutiny). 
 173. E.g. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding that mental 
retardation, because it is an immutable characteristic, deserves only rational basis review and not 
heightened scrutiny). 
 174. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206 (2005). 
 175. See e.g. id. at 440. 
 176. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (gender discrimination case). 
 177. See e.g. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (classification involving individuals who were mentally 
retarded). 
 178. See generally e.g. id. at 442, 454 (one of many cases that find a legitimate purpose to a law that 
arguably includes too many people or not enough people when applied). 
 179. N.H. H. 299, 158th Gen. Ct., 2d Year. 
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late divorced parents’ equal protection rights.  This argument was made 
and addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Curtis.180 
Curtis was a divorced father who petitioned the Court to terminate his 
child support obligation for his two oldest children, both of whom were 
attending college.181  In his petition, Curtis challenged the Pennsylvania 
statute, which permitted trial courts to issue orders requiring divorced par-
ents to pay for their children’s higher education.182  As a result, Curtis 
made a constitutional challenge arguing that the Pennsylvania statute was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.183  According to the Curtis Court, the essence of 
equal protection is to treat persons in “like circumstances” similarly, but 
equal protection does not require that all persons under all circumstances 
enjoy identical protection under the law.184  States are allowed to classify 
different groups, and thereby treat them unequally, as long as the classifi-
cations are not arbitrary, and the classifications bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the stated purpose of the legislation.185 
The Curtis Court, in deciding this post-secondary education issue, ap-
plied the rational basis test because the statute, in the Court’s opinion, did 
not implicate a suspect class or infringe upon any fundamental right.186  
Further, the Court stated that an individual right to post-secondary educa-
tion is not provided by the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.187  The Court found the Pennsylvania legislature’s purpose in 
passing the statute was to require “some parental financial assistance for a 
higher education for children of parents who are . . . divorced.”188  Al-
though the Court recognized that some young adults do in fact need finan-
cial assistance to attend higher education institutions, the Court took issue 
with the state “selectively . . . compel[ling]” only parents from non-intact 
families to provide such assistance.189  As a result, the Curtis Court held 
that there was no rational basis for the State to require divorced parents to 
financially provide for their adult children’s post-secondary education.190   
To support the Court’s decision, the Court discussed a conceivable hy-
pothetical situation that demonstrated the arbitrariness of the Pennsylvania 
  
 180. 666 A.2d at 267. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 268. 
 186. Id. at 268-69. 
 187. Id. at 268. 
 188. Id. at 269. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 269-70. 
File: Leonard - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 507 Created on: 6/7/2006 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:31:00 PM 
2006 POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION PAYMENTS AND DIVORCE 523 
statute.191  Under the statute, which the Court ultimately invalidated, the 
Court found it possible for a divorced parent to have two children, each 
from a separate marriage, with one child residing with the parent and one 
child not residing with the parent.192  In this situation, the Court stated that 
the statute would require the parent to provide post-secondary education 
support for the second child, but would not require the parent to provide 
support for the first child.  The Court then shifted the equal protection fo-
cus from the divorced parent to the young adult in need of education assis-
tance.193  As a result, the Court ruled that the classification detailed in the 
hypothetical treated similarly situated young adults in need of higher edu-
cation assistance unequally.194  Since no rational reason existed to treat 
children of divorce differently than children of marriage, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court overturned the discriminatory statute.195 
B. Equal Protection Arguments Contravening the New Hampshire 
Amendment 
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Curtis, and before 
the New Hampshire legislature amended RSA § 458:17 by removing the 
trial court’s power to order divorced parents to contribute to their adult 
child’s education, the law in New Hampshire was controlled by LeClair, 
which addressed the equal protection argument as it related to divorced 
parents.196   
In LeClair, the Court ordered the plaintiff father, Ronald LeClair, to 
contribute to the costs of his adult son’s college education.197  In disagree-
ing with the lower court’s order, LeClair appealed the decision arguing that 
the New Hampshire statute violated his, and all divorced parents’, equal 
protection rights.198  LeClair argued that ordering divorced parents to pay 
for an adult child’s college expenses is a violation of the State and Federal 
Constitutions because the courts do not have the same power to issue a 
similar order to a married parent.199  While it was unclear whether the 
plaintiff properly preserved the equal protection issue for appeal, the Court 
  
 191. Id. at 270 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. 624 A.2d at 1355-58. 
 197. Id. at 1352. 
 198. Id. at 1355.  Note that the New Hampshire statute in question when LeClair was decided was 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:17(I). 
 199. Id. (The plaintiff cited Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as the provisions violated by N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.  
§ 458:17 (I).). 
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decided to address the issue anyway “because similar claims may [arise] in 
the future.”200 
In deciding the equal protection issue, the Court relied on the New 
Hampshire State Constitution because the Federal Constitution did not 
offer greater protection under the equal protection provisions.201  The 
Court, before deciding which level of scrutiny to apply to this issue in New 
Hampshire, asked whether the state action in question treated similarly 
situated persons differently.202  The Court ruled that under the New Hamp-
shire statute, married parents and divorced parents were similarly situ-
ated.203  Additionally, the Court stated that under New Hampshire law, 
equal protection does not forbid group classifications, but requires courts 
to examine the individual rights affected as well as the purpose and scope 
of the created classifications.204 
The LeClair Court first considered the “strict scrutiny” test, which puts 
the onus on the government to show a compelling state interest to deter-
mine the classification’s validity.205  In order for strict scrutiny to apply in 
New Hampshire, the suspect classification must be based on “race, creed, 
color, gender, national origin, or legitimacy” or affect a fundamental 
right.206  The Court, relying on precedent, stated that decisions regarding 
custody and the rearing of minor children involve fundamental rights.207   
The LeClair Court next addressed the “rational basis” test, where state 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be upheld if the classification 
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.208  
According to New Hampshire precedent, if no suspect class or fundamen-
tal or substantive is right involved, rational basis review is applied, espe-
cially when economic classifications are at issue.209  The LeClair Court 
then cited Couture v. Couture,210 where the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court held that the classification between divorced parents with minor 
children and divorced adults without minor children in an alimony scheme 
should be addressed under the rational basis test.211 
  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1355-56 (citing State v. LaPorte, 587 A.2d 1237, 1239 (N.H. 1991) and Merrill v. City of 
Manchester, 466 A.2d 923, 927 (N.H. 1983)). 
 207. Id. at 1356 (citing Provencal v. Provencal, 451 A.2d 374, 377 (N.H. 1982)). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (quoting Petition of State Employees’ Assn. v. Goulette, 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987)). 
 210. 471 A.2d 1191 (N.H. 1984). 
 211. Leclair, 624 A.2d at 1356 (citing Couture, 471 A.2d at 1192). 
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After outlining both equal protection options, the LeClair Court, in 
analogizing the case to Couture, chose to apply rational basis review of the 
New Hampshire statute because LeClair’s argument rested primarily on an 
economic issue.212 However, the Court did not find any fundamental or 
important substantive right under the New Hampshire Constitution in-
fringed by the statute.213  The Court found that the statute’s objective was 
to ensure that children of divorced parents would not be unjustly deprived 
of opportunities they otherwise would have received had their parents not 
divorced.214  Based on the statute’s policy, the Court held that New Hamp-
shire had a legitimate state interest in providing educational opportunities 
to children whose families were no longer intact.215   
The LeClair Court’s ruling was based on the long-standing power of 
New Hampshire superior courts’ judges to oversee financial arrangements 
of divorced families, including support decisions.216  The Court distin-
guished between intact families, where financial support of the family unit 
is the unquestioned responsibility of an intact family, and divorced fami-
lies, where conflicts and disputes often necessitate the court’s role in mak-
ing financial orders.217  This distinction, in the Court’s eyes, supported the 
legislature’s decision to require divorced parents to contribute to their adult 
child’s post-secondary education because children of divorce may be less 
likely than children of intact families to receive financial support from both 
of their parents.218 
Two years after LeClair was decided, Curtis addressed the LeClair 
Court’s decision to uphold the New Hampshire statute based on a legiti-
mate state interest.219  The Curtis Court did not follow the rationale in Le-
Clair, in part, because the Court disagreed with the classification the Le-
Clair Court applied to the post-secondary education issue.220  In the eyes of 
the Curtis Court, the issue was not whether the classification treated mar-
ried parents and divorced parents differently, but whether similarly situated 
young adults in need of financial assistance may be treated differently.221  
By applying the same rational basis test as the LeClair Court applied, Cur-
tis struck down the Pennsylvania law permitting trial courts to issue orders 
  
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1356-57. 
 214. Id. at 1357. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. 666 A.2d at 270. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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requiring divorced parents to provide for their adult child’s post-secondary 
education.222 
The reason for the opposing ruling, according to the Curtis Court, was 
that certain young adults who needed financial assistance to attain a higher 
education, namely children of divorce, should not be the only children who 
have the legal means to overcome their financial difficulties (by going to 
court and getting a court order against their parent(s)).223  The Curtis Court 
ruled that the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutionally violated the equal 
protection rights of young adults because those children whose parents 
were still married had no access to the same judicial involvement, which 
could grant them the financial assistance.224  As a result, the Curtis Court 
held that “no rational reason [existed for why] those similarly situated with 
respect to needing funds for [post-secondary] education, should be treated 
unequally.”225 
IV. ANALYSIS: ADVOCATING IN FAVOR OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE 
AMENDMENT 
The New Hampshire law prohibiting judges from ordering divorced 
parents to pay for higher education costs, and thereby removing judicial 
discretion, is the model that all states, which permit judicial discretion 
when making these types of orders, should adopt.  Not only do post-
secondary education orders violate the equal protection rights of the di-
vorced parents, but as Curtis pointed out, the equal protection rights of 
children from intact families is also violated.226  The simplest solution is 
for all states to remove judicial discretion from the college decision when 
dealing with divorced families.  Parents should be able to decide whether 
they are willing, and financially able, to pay for their children’s college 
education without any outside influences. 
One of the unresolved issues between the states is what exactly consti-
tutes “educational expenses,” and what judges can order parents to pay for.  
In New Hampshire, prior to the 2004 amendment, educational expenses 
were defined as “tuition, books, room, board, and other directly related 
fees.”227  However, in addition to the “educational expenses” outlined by 
the New Hampshire courts, Illinois permits judges to go further by allow-
  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 269-70. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 270. 
 226. Id. 
 227. In re Gilmore, 803 A.2d at 604. 
File: Leonard - 4 Pierce L. Rev. 507 Created on: 6/7/2006 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 6/11/2006 9:31:00 PM 
2006 POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION PAYMENTS AND DIVORCE 527 
ing them to order parents to pay for college dues and fees, transportation 
expenses, registration and application costs, medical expenses, and living 
expenses incurred during the school year or during school recess.228  If a 
child turned eighteen and decided against going to college, courts would 
have no power to order parents to make these types of financial contribu-
tions.  But, since some states have determined that parents not only have a 
responsibility but an obligation to provide for their child’s college educa-
tion, those states have permitted courts to make educational support orders 
despite the fact that the orders clearly violate the equal protection rights of 
those parents.   
Two additional problems remain: (1) what happens when parents can-
not afford to make the court ordered education contribution while continu-
ing to pay the monthly expenses they incur; and (2) what happens if the 
policy of an intact family provided that the children are solely responsible 
for paying their own way through college, but the parents subsequently 
divorce?   
The first issue has been discussed in some state court opinions.  In Illi-
nois, an appeals court ignored a parent’s request to remove an order requir-
ing him to pay for his children’s college education because the court found 
the trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion in making the order.229  
The Illinois appeals court followed state policy and required the father to 
make post-secondary education payments rather than consider his situation 
and what the added expenses would do to his standard of living.  In most 
states that permit courts to issue educational orders, the financial limita-
tions of the parents are considered before an order is made.   
In Texas, however, a parent’s finances are never considered by the 
court because parents are only required to provide their children with the 
“necessities of life,” which include food, clothing, shelter and medical at-
tention.230  The Texas format is much more sensible because it not only 
ensures children are adequately provided for, but it allows parents, and not 
courts, to determine whether they can afford to pay for college expenses.  
More importantly, however, the Texas law allows parents to decide 
whether they want to pay for those expenses.  Since college educations are 
not considered fundamental rights in this country, a parent’s desire and 
financial capability should be the overriding factors in determining 
whether to pay for their child’s college expenses. 
The second issue has only been addressed in New Jersey where courts 
are required to consider whether a parent would have contributed towards 
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the cost of a child’s college education.231  Courts make the most egregious 
equal protection violations in these situations.  Imagine a family where for 
the entirety of childhood, the child’s parents encouraged the child to go to 
college, but always told the child that they would not provide any financial 
help, either for personal reasons or financial reasons.  If this were the 
stated family policy and the child always knew it, why should a court be 
allowed to issue an order requiring one or both divorced parents to contrib-
ute to their child’s college education just because they got divorced?  This 
example demonstrates a clear violation of a person’s equal protection 
rights since a court cannot step into an intact family and issue the same 
type of order.  So while considering a parent’s intent about paying for col-
lege prior to divorce is a step in the right direction, parents in similar situa-
tions should never be forced to pay for college expenses.   
In addition to infringing the equal protection rights of parents who are 
divorced, states that allow judges to issue educational orders also violate 
the equal protection rights of children of intact families.  Since post-
secondary education is not a fundamental right, courts, when issuing orders 
for children of divorce, infringe on the rights of children from intact fami-
lies since they have no remedy if their parents are unwilling to pay for col-
lege.  As the Curtis Court points out, there is no rational reason why simi-
larly situated young adults who are in need of educational funds should be 
denied them just because their parents have stayed together.232  As a result, 
states that allow courts to issue educational orders are actually punishing 
children whose parents cannot afford to pay for their college expenses, for 
whatever reason, because the children’s parents remained married.  There-
fore, states, like California, that have a policy for all citizens to receive 
college educations are indirectly rewarding divorce by not permitting all 
children to have access to the courts should their parents decide not to pay 
for post-secondary education expenses. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Given all of the potential problems with courts issuing educational or-
ders, not to mention the different standards in states across the country, all 
states should follow New Hampshire’s lead and pass laws removing judi-
cial discretion from all post-secondary education issues.  The result would 
be that parents would only have to pay for college if they volunteered to do 
so.  Following New Hampshire would not only prevent future litigation in 
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this area, but further problems between children receiving the funds and 
their resentful parents could be avoided since parents would not be forced 
to pay expenses they either could not afford or would never have volun-
teered to pay in the first place.  In addition, children across the country 
would be treated exactly the same since the remedies currently available 
only to children of divorce would be eliminated.  If the goal of all state 
legal systems is to treat all people the same, regardless of where they live 
or what their marital status is, only one option exists: for all states to re-
move judicial discretion and give parents the option of deciding whether or 
not to pay for their child’s college expenses. 
 
